Pakistan made the mistake of entering an unwinnable war

At the request of his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, the then-prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, set off on a historic diplomatic visit to Pakistan on February 20, 1999. The two prime ministers enshrined their visions of growth and prosperity for their peoples, as well as peace and stability between their nations, in the Lahore Declaration, which they signed the next day.

Hailed with great enthusiasm on both sides of the border, the proclamation emerged from the shadow of the nuclear testing in 1998 that had raised tensions. Unfortunately, the hope proved to be misplaced. Pakistani forces were crossing the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector and establishing themselves on heights like Tololing and Tiger Hill, names that would become etched in the public consciousness, even as Sharif was welcoming Vajpayee at the Wagah border.

Kargil’s terrain, with its 18,000-foot peaks, presented incredible difficulties. It was a genuine test of fortitude to fight in such harsh circumstances, and only because of the commanders’ and troops’ incredible perseverance and readiness to give their lives for their nation could the war be won.

India claimed victory on July 26 after a brutal struggle that lasted over three months after the incursions were first discovered on May 3. The Pakistani army ultimately dishonored the sacrifice of its soldiers by refusing to accept their deaths and admitting they had been involved in the conflict.

Despite its limited scope and geographic reach, the Kargil War forced both nations to conduct in-depth strategic analyses. There was a significant amount of discussion on the national security deficiencies in India, notably an intelligence failure that allowed intrusions to go unnoticed, and the miscalculations that precipitated the war with Pakistan. With hindsight, we can evaluate the degree to which both nations have implemented the lessons they have learned.

The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) was established by the Indian government three days after the conflict to examine the circumstances that led to the Pakistani invasion and suggest countermeasures to protect the country’s security against military incursions. The committee observed that there was a growing interest in maintaining the status quo among the military, intelligence, political, and bureaucratic organizations. In light of the continuing proxy war, the nuclearized security environment, and the Kargil experience, it emphasized the need for a thorough assessment of the national security system.

After the KRC, the Group of Ministers (GoM) produced a report that was likely the most thorough analysis of national security concerns carried out in India since independence. To emphasize the gravity of the post-war review, four task groups were formed to analyze the intelligence apparatus, internal security, border control, and defense management.

Numerous modifications to national security management were brought about by the two studies. In order to manage electronic intelligence and centralized communication, the National Technical Research Organization was established in 2004. To meet the unique intelligence requirements of the armed forces, the Defence Intelligence Agency was established. In order to promote improved interagency collaboration and information sharing, a multi-agency center was established.

There was some reform within the defense establishment. Among them were the establishment of the Strategic Forces, the Andaman and Nicobar Commands, the Integrated Defence Staff, and the transfer of budgetary and administrative authority to the three services. In 2020, the GoM recommended that the Chief of Defence Staff be appointed.

Only a few of the proposals have been fully implemented. The GoM had observed: “A lack of responsibility on the side of the troops has also resulted from the multiplicity of units on the same boundary. The idea of “one border, one force” may be embraced while taking into consideration the force posture at the frontier in order to ensure accountability. The Line of Actual Control with China, where the Indian Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police are stationed under separate command structures, is one area where this idea has not yet been implemented.

The lack of a national security policy and the failure to commit funding to the military beyond the fiscal year were among the flaws highlighted by the GoM. Jointness in the armed forces and deeper government integration of the service headquarters were other issues that needed to be resolved. These deficiencies are still present.

The Kargil crisis sparked a great deal of public discussion in Pakistan. The battle made clear how unbalanced civil-military relations were, with military goals being set without regard for diplomatic or political ramifications. In her book From Kargil to the Coup, Nasim Zehra states that on May 17, the army provided then-prime minister Sharif with the first comprehensive briefing on the operation. Soldiers were already in their posts all throughout the LoC at this point.

The generals who orchestrated the conspiracy should have been held accountable after the war. Rather, the military in Pakistan attempted to place the responsibility on the civilian establishment, and escalating mistrust ultimately resulted in the military takeover that drove Sharif from office in October 1999.

Pakistan’s use of force against India proved to be futile as the Kargil crisis made abundantly clear. India will not only respond with more force than Pakistan, but the world community would also shun Pakistan for such an act. After the war, violence in Jammu and Kashmir increased as a result of the Pakistani army’s reliance on using terrorists rather than seeking measures to ease tensions with India.

Many analysts said Pakistan should concentrate on developing a robust economy instead of being fixated on Kashmir. Former Pakistani ambassador Shahid Amin said in a letter that the nation has to brutally accept its constraints and objectives. The survival of Pakistan must come first.

However, the fundamental problems that propelled Pakistan into an unwinnable war have not been sufficiently addressed. The country’s military remains in charge, there is ongoing rhetoric on Kashmir, the economy is in terrible shape, and the government continues to provide assistance to terrorist groups.

India is a much stronger country now, and a situation similar to Kargil doesn’t seem conceivable. But the war of 1999 exposed a degree of carelessness in the Pakistani leadership, and the present situation in that nation does nothing to reverse that perception.