Engaging in a strategic handshake with Dragon would benefit both parties

De-escalation and disengagement in east Ladakh are part of the declared government strategy on the bilateral engagement with China, which is based on restoring peace and calm along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). If this feature is overemphasized, it might be seen as a strong political will expressed via a rigid attitude rather than as pragmatism. In addition to being our largest neighbor, China is a significant global force that we should continue to interact with in a number of venues and on a range of topics of shared interest.

In spite of border concerns, China and India remain significant participants in global alliances such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The latter is really growing significantly, with several countries vying for admission. In fora such as the IMF and WTO, China and India have consistently voiced their agreement and unity against the stance taken by Western nations.

Additionally, both countries have a lengthy history of coordinating and cooperating on international environmental forums. Even while China is very concerned about the Quad, it acknowledges India’s strategic autonomy. Even though attempts have been made to lessen this reliance via import substitution and free trade agreements with ASEAN nations, China has been one of our main sources of imports for the last 15 years and has been growing economically in terms of trading connections with India. As a consequence, there is a growing trade imbalance that favors China.

The tense and hostile environment on the LAC is likely to persist despite these similarities, with the likelihood of nasty face-offs between the Indian Army and the PLA. The discussions at the level of military commanders in east Ladakh have grown bogged down and have turned into a Chinese exercise in filibustering. The Indian Army has reacted forcefully and strengthened its capabilities by deploying more soldiers and equipment. In other words, we see it as a strategy of measured engagement on other matters and containment on the northern frontiers.

India has to maintain its leverage in such a situation. Surprisingly, in the past, we have not maximized these features and have instead chosen to satisfy a cunning and crafty foe like China.

First and foremost is the Tibet problem, which seems to be losing importance on a global scale. The Chinese saw the fact that the political and spiritual leader of Tibet was granted safety in India as an act of hostility. The Chinese Communist Party has long been displeased with the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), also known as the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, for being permitted to establish itself in Dharamsala. Although it was a brave gesture in 1959, India has gone too far in attempting to play down this card throughout the years due to Chinese mania over Tibet and “splittist” Tibetans.

This is a perplexing approach towards a nation that disregards Indian sensibilities and makes no effort to conceal its opinions toward J&K. China has no qualms about impeding India’s attempts at the UN to add Pakistani terrorists to the roster of designated terrorists. The outrageous actions of a permanent Security Council member only serve to highlight Pakistan’s preference for its close ally’s narrow interests above its international commitments.

With the Dalai Lama moving into hiding, the CTA is now in more control of political matters, although the Dalai Lama’s charisma remains the main strength of the Tibetan cause. The current Dalai Lama, who is getting on in age, has even hinted that the institution may dissolve after his death, thus its future is not quite clear. Both the Chinese and Indian governments may have different strategies in mind, but the CTA is a permanent fixture that should be used to India’s advantage.

With the US playing hot and cold in the game of power politics in the South China Sea, Taiwan is China’s most sensitive subject. Despite acknowledging the one-China principle, India maintains semi-formal connections and relationships with Taiwan. The substantial commercial links between India and Taiwan are acknowledged by the quasi-missions of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India and the India-Taipei Association in Taiwan.

Retired military commanders, politicians, and artists have visited Taiwan, proving that one cannot wish Taiwan away. It’s interesting to note that in 1999, while working for the BJP, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Taiwan. Since its revision in 2018, a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan has been in effect, indicating a strong and expanding economic partnership with significant potential.

This must go on and acquire additional information. By constructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Communist China has flagrantly ignored Indian concerns regarding Kashmir’s geographical inviolability as an essential component of this nation. India has to play up the Taiwan problem and raise doubts about its standing in order to get back in the same currency and provide a point of pressure for tough negotiations.

Beyond all of this, India must consider a long-term solution to the complex and increasingly contentious Lacca-Alavasque conflict. China’s political calculation indicates that its leadership is an expert at delaying difficult decisions. That shouldn’t stop our leadership, however, from trying to find a solution to a major issue that affects the economy and security.

Although it is anticipated that the next Indian administration would place a high priority on economic growth and development, it may also have the greatest chance of finding a comprehensive solution to the border dispute with China. In order to find a good solution, this would need some give and take, for which the political story would need to be developed. Mutual interest would undoubtedly dictate a strategic handshake over the Himalayas with the Dragon.