A half-century of Operation Meghdoot

Forty years have passed since the first group of Indian forces were sent to the Siachen Glacier in order to stop Pakistan from taking control of the world’s coldest, tallest, and maybe most difficult frontline. The Indian Army and the Indian Air Force (IAF) began Operation Meghdoot on April 13, 1984.

It was obvious that there was more to both sides’ border assertions than first seemed. Pakistanis were working toward a plan that was conceived in China in the 1960s to connect the northern regions of Aksai Chin and to utilize the 100 million acres of freshwater resources (which Siachen possesses) that China and Pakistan sorely need: China to realize its goal of becoming a microchip giant, and Pakistan to build more dams and generate hydroelectric power.

It is said that a 30-cm-square silicon wafer may be created by combining chemicals, desert sand, and 10,000 liters of fresh or river water. Furthermore, Pakistan turned over a large number of glaciers—242 in the Shaksgam valley inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—to China in February and March 1963, only months after India’s disastrous 1962 election.

Siachen is positioned between Aksai Chin and the Shaksgam valley. Thus, it offers India a significant strategic advantage. In response to proposals by Lt Gen ML Chibber, the Northern Army commander at the time, India’s military presence on the snowy heights around the glacier was started in 1984 with government approval. However, neither the area’s strategic significance nor our goal of capturing any land were given any thought, he claimed.

The only goal was to make sure we didn’t encounter a fait accompli similar to what happened in Aksai Chin in the early 1950s. It was understandable that New Delhi had been wary of topographical inconsistencies along its borders ever since the Chinese invasion of 1962.

The Siachen issue really stems from a cartography debate. With a few changes, the 1949 CFL (Cease Fire Line) is now the Line of Control (LoC). This de facto border runs north of Jammu and stops abruptly at NJ 9842, a Himalayan peak. According to the India-Pakistan accords of Karachi (1949) and Suchetgarh (1972), the glacier is located beyond that in no man’s land. However, since the 1970s, the Siachin Glacier has been included in Pakistan on a number of international maps.

These included the London-published Times Atlas of the World, the University of Chicago’s A Historical Atlas of South Asia, and the National Geographic Society’s Atlas of the World. Each of them depicted the CFL stretching northeastward from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass and the Chinese border. Not even Pakistani maps had done this up to that point.

This geographical mistake seems to have originated from early US Defence Mapping Agency maps from the 1970s and 1980s, which showed the LoC extending northeast from the location of NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. The air defense information zone (ADIZ) markings, which give zoning limits for air traffic controllers in civil and military aircraft, may have been “translated” into a boundary line.

This seems to be the most likely explanation for the blunder committed by American mapmakers. For Pakistanis, this implied that the Line of Command (LoC) extended from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass, and it therefore became a matter of faith. These are not national borders, however there may be many ADIZs that cross a single nation. The Pakistani army, however, was further incentivized to question the legitimacy of the LoC beyond NJ 9842—where the Siachen region is located—by the publishing of such maps by several of the world’s most reputable atlases.

Prodded by ambitious military leaders, Pakistan first planned to seize the glacier heights around Siachen under then President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. Military personnel are aware that taking up heights may help protect a territory. And in this instance, our defense against Pakistan’s adventurism is the Saltoro Ridge. Hundreds of people died early on while trying to cling to the glacier’s western side due to a lack of acclimatization. Nonetheless, the Indian Army maintained its position with the IAF’s logistical support.

By dominating the heights, our forces were able to acquire total control over the glacier throughout the 1984–1987 period. Pakistan was caught off guard by all of this, and its repeated efforts to drive out Indian soldiers have failed since. Thanks to the tenacity and will of our soldiers, they now discuss returning to the pre-1984 positions since the Pakistani army is ashamed to acknowledge these setbacks in public.

Pakistan’s forces are forced to camp in the lower valleys and gaze up in wonder at the Indian soldiers, as the Indian Army now controls the Saltoro Ridge. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s military hierarchy has been lying about their unsuccessful operations in Siachen for forty years. The belief that India cannot afford to maintain soldiers near the glacier has been propagated by certain sections of the Pakistani media. Conversely, India can afford it with ease. Siachen consumes a minor portion of India’s defense budget, which has increased to nearly Rs 6.21 lakh crore, at an annual cost of over Rs 2,000 crore.

The main focus of the bilateral negotiations is India’s demand that Pakistan recognize the progress Indian forces have made along the glacier and accept the 110-kilometer-long Actual Ground Position Line prior to any military pullout. After the 1999 Kargil conflict, the Indian Army is looking for unwavering assurances from Pakistan, such as signed maps attesting to India’s military victories and army location verification. However, Pakistanis are averse to taking this action. If India gives up the hard-won victories of many brave troops, the situation would resemble the tragic 1972 Simla Agreement.