The Xiaokang initiative by China keeps India vigilant

Many stories have surfaced about China constructing contemporary border communities and populating them. On March 28, which marks the 65th anniversary of China’s occupation of Tibet, Beijing arranged a number of festivities in the newly established communities along the borders with Bhutan and India. According to the most recent information, China plans to build 175 more border communities in addition to the 628 “Xiaokang” (wealthy villages) that are now there.

The Xiaokang plan, disguised as border area development, is focused on expanding through coercion. Deng Xiaoping introduced the approach in 1979 with the goal of ensuring the equal development of Chinese society by reducing rural poverty. By integrating border areas with the mainland, President Xi Jinping has made it a strategic one and improved the security of its land borders, especially in Tibet, which is located across from Arunachal Pradesh.

427 model towns have been built on the front lines as part of the Xiaokang project, while another 201 are on the second tier. These settlements are dispersed over 21 border counties, which include the significant cities of Nyingchi, Ngari, Xigaze, and Lohka. In Lohka, China has established 354 “prosperous” border communities with Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. Near the Line of Actual Control (LAC), about one-third of these communities were constructed. The total budget allotted for building these habitats, including auxiliary infrastructure, was around $4.6 billion.

As a result of the October 2017 results of the 19th Party Congress, Xi had urged skilled Chinese nationals to labor in the isolated regions inhabited by ethnic minorities, with the main goal being to alter the demographic composition. The Han population in Tibet has increased by around 12% in the last ten years. The Tibet Autonomous Region’s total sinicization is the communist regime’s ultimate goal. All border villages, particularly those that border Nepal, Bhutan, and India, have access to first-rate facilities including electricity, roads, and even Internet connections. Furthermore, there are now 206 industrial projects being built.

The length of the Tibet road network will be 1,18,000 km by 2021. The Hotan-Xigaze, Gyirong-Xigaze, and Chengdu-Wuhan-Shanghai high-speed railway lines have finished their preliminary work. Along with modernizing 39 civilian airports, the 14th Five-Year Plan seeks to construct a world-class airport cluster around Chengdu and Chongqing. In Tibet-South Xinjiang, twelve airports are either operating or in the process of being built. With the completion of the 1,078-kilometer “Snow Mountain Oil Dragon Pipeline” from Golmud to Lhasa, Tibet will have ten oil depots.

In an effort to strengthen border control, China has recently established two national regulations. Passed in 2021, the National Defense Law gives the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) more authority to work with civil agencies to further national objectives. The Land Border Law was established a year later in an effort to strengthen Chinese control over encroached territory. Articles 10 and 43 directly affect India’s border development programs by contesting the current state of affairs regarding the construction of border infrastructure. China has begun a cartographic attack against India, claiming Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh, and Barahoti as its own. Places in these regions are given Mandarin names as part of China’s “Three Warfare” strategy, which also includes psychological, legal, and media aspects.

As the first head of state to visit Lhasa in thirty years, Xi aimed to establish Tibet as a “ironclad shield” during his July 2021 visit. As a result, border villages—particularly in contested regions like Doklam and Long Ju—have been included in the PLA’s broader defense preparations to serve as advance posts. In the border regions, former Han military men are settling down. China is acting in accordance with its “Grey Zone Warfare,” in which militia troops and civilians fight without using force. The way Beijing operates in the South China Sea serves as an example of this.

India’s border regions remained undeveloped in the absence of a defined strategy, particularly those that faced China. India only started improving its roads and surface connectivity in border areas following China’s enormous infrastructure development in Tibet and Xinjiang. The Vibrant communities Programme (VVP) was introduced last year to provide residents in border communities the necessary amenities. Consequently, by year’s end, 168 unconnected villages along China’s border will be connected. A financial allotment of

The creation of sufficient infrastructure in 663 border villages across 19 districts has cost Rs 4,800 crore.

The Indian initiative envisions a “hub and spoke” model that is governed by the district government and gram panchayats, with the Central Government’s involvement being restricted to money. This is in stark contrast to the Chinese-controlled Xiaokang. The VVP is primarily concerned with advancing socioeconomic projects. On the other hand, a dual-use strategy that takes security into account is required.

India is also building a lot of infrastructure, such as railroads, airports, border highways, canals, and the Dibang hydroelectric power plants. These are paid for using funds from the Rs 12,882.2 crore “Gross Budgetary Assistance” allocation for the northeastern region’s overall development.

With the disputed border and the current Ladakh stalemate, there are significant strategic implications to the Chinese strategy. With the Xiaokang villages in place, Beijing’s intention to unilaterally change the status of LAC would gain even more momentum. Additionally, China has ignored Article VII of the 2005 agreement titled “Political parameters and Guiding Principles for the settlement of the boundary issue,” which states that the current population arrangement along borders should not be altered.

We need a de novo strategy to properly oppose Chinese expansionist intentions. Our reflexive, “tit for tat” mentality is out of date. An all-encompassing examination of border management is needed. It should be the centerpiece of the National Security Strategy, which is strangely still being developed.