The caste role in Kerala politics—an unwritten code
Speaker A N Shamseer’s spontaneous comment from last July rattled the Left in Kerala for a few weeks. The CPM was steadfast in its support of its leader in the face of intense political pressure.
The NSS, a majority community organization, however, alarmed the Left with its aggressive posture when it initiated a faith protection campaign similar to its “Namajapa Ghoshayathra” during the Sabarimala scandal in 2019.
Notably, Left leaders refrained from confronting NSS chief G Sukumaran Nair directly in spite of provocations. Community leaders, including him and SNDP general secretary Vellappally Natesan, have long maintained their status as an elite group in state politics.
Few political figures in the state can really claim to have avoided their vicious criticism at any point. Apart from a few like the late M N Govindan Nair, veteran CPM member V S Achuthanandan, Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan, and trailblazing P C George, most political figures have refrained from taking aim at community leaders, adhering to a kind of “unwritten” political etiquette.
These socio-political figures are in many respects more than just the chieftains of their villages; they are the living examples of “identity politics,” a phenomenon that Kerala has long practiced. The influence of casteist organizations in Keralan society tends to be more regressive the more progressive Kerala purports to be.
When it comes to elections, Keralan politics really emerges. Caste and religion permutations have always been important factors in everything from seat-sharing to candidate selection and cabinet vacancy allocation.
Community equations are important in the selection of candidates. Consider the capital of the state. Here, candidates from the well-known Nadar community used to be favored. The first to break this trend in recent decades was the Left.
In a same vein, some groups tend to favor politicians from the Nair, Ezhava, Latin Catholic, or maybe certain Muslim communities.
It would be incorrect to believe that Kerala’s “progressive” voters are only motivated by philosophy. While balancing out religious equations, the three fronts in Kerala—the LDF, UDF, and NDA—typically keep caste equations intact.
But sometimes, the BJP and the Left have nominated candidates who don’t follow the typical pattern. Very few exclusions.
According to the CSDS-Kerala NES post-poll polls, there was a significant change in the ways that various communities voted in the 2019 local elections. In the case of the Nair community, which makes up around 14% of the state’s population, this was more relevant.
Because of the Sabarimala dispute, Nair votes against the LDF saw a significant consolidation in the 2019 elections. In the end, the actual winner of the change was the BJP. The UDF also made some progress.
“It’s true that voting patterns have always shifted based on caste,” says Kerala University political scientist Prof. KM Sajad Ibrahim.
In 2019, there was a noticeable change in the Nair votes from the Left to the BJP. Minorities, however, supported the Left. This also persisted in the assembly votes for 2021. The Left has a decent possibility of winning more votes for Ezhava this time. There are signs that the Muslim community may potentially provide the Left with a significant amount of support.
The UDF had a 1% rise in their Nair vote-share in 2019, whilst the BJP saw a 7% increase in Nair votes from 2014 to 2019. Out of Nair votes, the LDF lost 8%.
In areas like Thrissur and Pathanamthitta where Hindu populations were predominate, the BJP saw an increase in votes.
Conversely, the voting behavior of the Ezhava group, which makes up around 26% of the state’s population, was mostly unchanged. Strangely, there was less impact from the participation of Bharath Dharma Jana Sena (BDJS), the SNDP’s political wing. Comparing 2019 to 2014, all three fronts had a 2% decrease in Ezhava votes.
Identity politics has expanded recently to include issues of gender, caste, and religion. However, political analyst N M Pearson contends that caste politics continue to constitute the foundation of the majority of political parties.
The fact that none of the political parties dare to field candidates from lower castes for non-reserved seats should be read in conjunction with this. And when it comes to important positions, the members of the higher castes emerge victorious.
At the end of the day, caste and religion influence state politics. Given the deeply rooted casteist attitude of Indian culture overall, Pearson points out that it is simple for caste and religion aspects to be dominant forces inside political organizations.
“The political landscape is dominated by caste politics, which is a terrible fact. This is largely due to the objectives that the major political parties have established. However, caste-based organizations like the BDJS or the National Democratic Party (NDP of the NSS) may not be as successful as groups focused on religion, like the Muslim League.
From 1974 to 1996, the NDP existed, but it had little effect. Established in 2015, the BDJS has also failed to leave its impression. Organizations like the International Kamaraj Congress, founded by Vaikunda Swamy Dharma Pracharana Sabha chairman Vishnupuram Chandrasekharan, and the Janadhipathya Rashtriya Sabha, founded by tribal leader C K Janu, have likewise failed to have a significant impact.
A number of other organizations, such as Kerala Pulayar Mahasabha, Kerala Vanika Vaisya Sangham or Kerala Brahmana Sabha, Yogakshema Sabha, and Kerala Dalit Federation, seldom make their political inclinations clear, even though the Pattikajathi Kshema Samithi is a political party’s feeder organization.
Ironically, however, major political parties continue to seek them out the most. Because caste politics are popular here.
No notable change in Ezhava’s vote share
The Ezhava group, which makes up about 26% of the state’s population, continued to vote in much the same ways. Strangely, there was less impact from the participation of Bharath Dharma Jana Sena (BDJS), the SNDP’s political wing.
